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Parameter and Insertion Function Co-synthesis for Opacity Enhancement in
Parametric Stochastic Discrete Event Systems
Bo Wu, Zhiyu Liu and Hai Lin
Abstract—Opacity is a property that characterizes the sys-
tem’s capability to keep its “secret” from being inferred by
an intruder that partially observes the system’s behavior. In
this paper, we are concerned with enhancing the opacity using
insertion functions, while at the same time, enforcing the task
specification in a parametric stochastic discrete event system.
We first obtain the parametric Markov decision process that
encodes all the possible insertions. Based on which, we convert
this parameter and insertion function co-synthesis problem into
a nonlinear program. We prove that if the output of this pro-
gram satisfies all the constraints, it will be a valid solution to our
problem. Therefore, the security and the capability of enforcing
the task specification can be simultaneously guaranteed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Opacity refers to a system’s capability to hide its “secret”
information from being inferred by an outside intruder. It is
often assumed that the intruder knows the system dynamic
or even the opacity enforcing strategy, but with only partial
observability to the system behavior. The secret is said to be
opaque to the intruder if, for every system behavior relevant
to the secret, there is an observationally equivalent non-secret
behavior, therefore the intruder is never sure about whether
the secret has occurred or not.
The research on opacity has received increasing interest
because of its applications in cybersecurity. There has been
abundant existing work in the last decade. The opacity
problem was first introduced in the computer science com-
munity [1] and quickly spread to discrete event system (DES)
researchers, see e.g [2], [3], [4].
There are essentially two main directions in the opacity
research — verification and enforcement. The verification
problem studies whether the system is opaque or not given
the system model, observation mask, and the secret. There
are many notions of opacity in the existing literature such as
language-based opacity (LBO) (the secret is in the form of
regular or ω regular languages), initial-state opacity (ISO)
(the initial state is the secret), current-state opacity (CSO)
(the secret is revealed if the intruder is sure that the current
state is a secret state), initial-and-final-state opacity (IFO)
(the initial and final states are a secret pair) and K-step
opacity (the intruder cannot infer any secret behavior hap-
pened in the past K steps). A verification algorithm for LBO
was introduced in [5] and its relationship with observability
and diagnosability of DES was discussed. The verification
The partial support of the National Science Foundation (Grant No.
CNS-1446288, ECCS-1253488, IIS-1724070) and of the Army Research
Laboratory (Grant No. W911NF- 17-1-0072) is gratefully acknowledged.
Bo Wu, Zhiyu Liu and Hai Lin are with the Department of Electrical
Engineering, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, 46556 USA.
bwu3@nd.edu, zliu9@nd.edu, hlin1@nd.edu
of ISO and IFO was studied in [6]. Cassez et.al [7] explores
the verification of CSO. It has been shown that these four
notions of opacity are equivalent and can be transformed
from one to another [6]. Therefore, in this paper, we focus
on CSO. Furthermore, the verification of K-step and infinite
step (where K → ∞) opacity were studied in [8], [9].
In recent years, opacity was also extended to probabilistic
systems to provide a quantitative measure of opacity instead
of just a yes or no binary answer. CSO in probabilistic finite
automata was introduced in [10]. In [11], quantification of
LBO in terms of ω-regular languages for Markov Decision
Process was studied and the problem was transformed to
probabilistic model checking [12].
On the other hand, there is also much progress in opacity
enforcement — synthesizing functions that modify observed
system behavior such that the opacity can be enforced or
maximized. Supervisory control theory [13] was adopted
in opacity-enforcing in [14], [15], [16], [17] where the
supervisor dynamically disables certain system behaviors
that would reveal the secret. Dynamic observer approach was
proposed in [18] where the observability of every system
event was dynamically changed. However, the approaches
mentioned above either constrain the full system behavior
or may create new observed behaviors that don’t exist in
the original system which leaves the clue of the defense
model. As a result, insertion functions that dynamically insert
observable events [4] and more recently, edit functions [19],
which can also erase events were introduced. The basic idea
is to introduce a game structure (called all insertion/edit
structure) that encodes all the valid system and insertion/edit
function moves. Then the synthesis of opacity enforcing
functions is equivalent to finding a winning strategy such that
no matter what the original system outputs, the opacity can
be enforced. The stochastic extension to insertion function
synthesis for maximized opacity was then introduced in [20]
where a Markov Decision Process (MDP) similar to AIS was
constructed, and dynamic programming was applied to find
the optimal insertion function.
To the best of our knowledge, however, there are no
results on opacity enforcement in parametric models while
also considering other task specifications. Therefore, in this
paper, we are motivated to fill this gap. By considering a
parametric stochastic discrete event system (PSDES) model
and a given task specification, we first get the parametric
Markov Decision Process (PMDP) that encodes all the pos-
sible insertion actions. Then the insertion function synthesis
and task specification enforcement problem is converted
into a nonlinear programming (NLP) that can be solved
to simultaneously synthesize the insertion function and the
parameters. We prove the correctness of our NLP if it finds
a valid solution that respects all our constraints.
In the rest of this paper, Section II defines the relevant
models. Section III introduces the basic of the opacity
notion and the insertion mechanism. Section IV formulates
our parameter and insertion function co-synthesis problem.
Section V presents our main results while running through
a motivating example. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, we consider the opacity in the framework of
the parametric stochastic discrete event system (PSDES).
A. Parametric Stochastic Discrete Event System (PSDES)
We first introduce discrete event systems (DES) modelled
as non-deterministic finite-state automata (NFA) [21] G =
(Q,Σ, δ, Q0), where Q is a finite set of states, Σ is a finite
set of events, δ : Q × Σ∗ → 2Q is a transition function,
Q0 ⊆ Q is a set of initial states. The generated language
L(G) = {ω ∈ Σ∗|∃q0 ∈ Q0, δ(q0, ω) is defined}. G is
assumed to be partially observable and Σ is partitioned into
two disjoint sets, namely observable set Σo and unobservable
set Σuo such that Σo ∪ Σuo = Σ. Given a string ω ∈ Σ∗,
an observation mask (natural projection) O : Σ∗ → Σ∗o is
defined recursively as O(ω) = O(ω′)O(σ) where ω = ω′σ,
ω′ ∈ Σ∗ and σ ∈ Σ, O(σ) = σ if σ ∈ Σo and O(σ) = ǫ if
σ ∈ Σuo ∪ {ǫ}, where ǫ stands for the empty string. Given
strings ω, ω′, if ω′ is a prefix of ω, we denote it as ω′  ω.
If ω′ is a strict prefix of ω, we denote it as ω′ ≺ ω.
A Stochastic Discrete Event System (SDES) is denoted
by H = (Q,Σ, P, π0), where Q is a finite set of states, Σ
is a finite set of events, P (q, σ, q′) → [0, 1] is a transition
function specifying the probability to transit from q ∈ Q to
q′ ∈ Q with the event σ ∈ Σ, π0 : Q → [0, 1] defines the
initial distribution.
In this paper, we have the following assumption to the
SDES model.
Assumption 1. Given an SDES H = (Q,Σ, P, π0), we
assume that
∑
q′∈Q
∑
σ∈Σ P (q, σ, q
′) ∈ {0, 1}. We also
require that
∑
q′∈Q
∑
σ∈Σuo
P (q, σ, q′) < 1.
This assumption essentially requires that each state is
either a sink with no outgoing transition, or all the transitions
sum up to 1. If there is an unobservable transition from s
to s′, there must also be at least one observable transition
from s to s′. It can be observed that we can associate an
SDES H = (Q,Σ, P, π0) to an NFA G = (Q,Σ, δ, Q0),
where δ(q, σ, q′) is defined if and only if P (q, σ, q′) > 0.
Q0 = {q|π0(q) > 0}. Therefore, the generated language of
H is defined to be, L(H) = L(G). Let |Q| = n, i.e., there
are n states in H , we denote Pσ where σ ∈ Σ as an n× n
matrix where Pσ(i, j) = P (qi, σ, qj). Pσ can be naturally
extended to Pω where ω ∈ Σ∗, Pω(i, j) = P (qi, ω, qj). For
ω = σ1σ2...σk ∈ Σ∗, Pω =
∏k
i=1 Pσi .
A PSDES PH = (Q,Σ, P, π0, V ) is an SDES that satis-
fies Assumption 1, where its transition function P (q, σ, q′) =
fq,σ,q′(V ) where V = {v1, v2, ..., vm} is a finite set of
0start
1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8
9
10
a, v1
b c
b
c, v2
a, v4
b, v5 a b
b, v3 a, v6
c, v7
b
b
Fig. 1. An communication network modelled as PSDES
parameters that are strictly positive and real-valued, and
fV ∈ FV . In this paper, FV is a set of posynomial functions
[22] which are defined in the form of
fV =
K∑
k=1
ckv
a1k
1 ...v
amk
m (1)
where ck ∈ R>0, aik ∈ R. Therefore, the transition probabil-
ities are parameterized by V . The transition probabilities of
the parametric models in many existing benchmarks can be
converted to this class [23]. A valuation v(V ) ∈ Rm maps
V to Rm. V alv denotes the set of all valuations.
Figure 1 shows a communication network modelled as a
PSDES PH = (Q,Σ, P, π0, V ), where Q = {0, 1, 2, ..., 10},
Σ = {a, b, c}, π0(0) = 1, V = {v1, ..., v7}. The information
generated in communication node 0 must be transmitted to
node 10 through routing. Σ denotes the message types and
P (q, σ, q′) denotes the probability that the communication
node q decides to transmit the data to q′ for routing purpose.
The label on each transition arrow from q to q′ is in the
form of σ, pv from P (q, σ, q
′) = pv. We omit the transition
probability if it is 1.
B. Parametric Markov Decision Process (PMDP)
An MDP is a tuple M = (S, π0, A, T ) where S =
{s0, s1, ...} is a finite set of states, π0 : S → [0, 1] is the
initial distribution, A is a finite set of actions, T (s, a, s′) :=
Pr(s′|s, a), for s, s′ ∈ S, a ∈ A.
For each state s ∈ S, we denote A(s) as the set of
available actions. A Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC)
is a special case of MDP with |A(s)| <= 1 for all s ∈ S,
where |A(s)| is the cardinality of the set A(s). It can be
observed that SDES H = (Q,Σ, P, π0) can be seen as an
MDP (more precisely, a DTMC) M = (Q, π0, A, T ), where
|A| = 1 and thus can be arbitrarily defined, T (q, a, q′) =∑
σ∈Σ P (q, σ, q
′).
Reasoning on an MDP requires resolving its nondetermin-
ism in the action selection, which is done by a scheduler.
Formally, a (memoryless) scheduler of a given MDP M is
defined to be µ(s, a) ∈ [0, 1] which denotes the probability
of choosing a ∈ A(s) at a state s ∈ S.
A parametric MDP is a tupleM = (S, π0, A, T, V ), where
V = {x1, ..., xn} is a finite set of parameters and T is in
the form T : S × A × S → FV , where FV is the set of
posynomial functions.
III. OPACITY NOTION AND ENFORCEMENT
A. Current state opacity
In this paper, we focus on the current state opacity (CSO)
property.
Definition 1. Given a DES G = (Q,Σ, δ, Q0), observation
mask O, and a set of secret states Qs ⊆ Q, the system is
current-state opaque if ∀ω ∈ Ls(G) = {ω ∈ L(G)|∃q0 ∈
Q0, δ(q0, ω) ∩Qs 6= ∅}, there exists another string ω′, such
that ω′ ∈ Lns(G) = {ω ∈ L(G)|∃q0 ∈ Q0, δ(q0, ω) ∩
(Q\Qs) 6= ∅} and O(ω) = O(ω′).
It can be seen that Ls(G) and Lns(G) are not necessarily
disjoint, that is, there may exist ω ∈ Ls(G) ∩ Lns(G). By
definition, such string will not violate the CSO requirement.
Intuitively, CSO requires that, if there is a string ω, such
that ∃q0 ∈ Q0, δ(q0, ω) ⊆ Qs, that is, the system state,
after executing ω, lands in some secret state for sure, then
there must exist another string ω′ ∈ Lns(G), such that
O(ω) = O(ω′). That is, they have the same observation but
ω′ may take the system to some nonsecret states. Therefore,
if there is an intruder that knows G and Qs and observes
the events with the observation mask O, it will never be
sure if the system is currently in some secret states. Thus,
whether the current system state is a secret state remains
opaque to the intruder. Formally, the set of observable strings
that will never reveal the secret can be written as Lsafe =
O[Lns(G)]\((O[L(G)]\O[Lns(G)])Σ∗o).
Verifying CSO can be done by constructing its observer
automaton in a standard way as in [21], and then checking
if any observer state contains solely secret states. Take
the system in Figure 1 as an example. It can be seen as
an NFA if we ignore the probabilities. The shaded states,
i.e., the communication nodes 8 and 9 are vulnerable to
potential attacks. If there is an outside intruder finds out
that the message reaches either 8 and 9, the message may
be intercepted. That is Qs = {8, 9}. We assume that all the
events are observable. Its observer automaton is identical to
the original system. It can be found that this system is not
opaque because if the intruder observes ba or bc, it will be
sure that the system is currently in state 8 or 9.
Given an SDES H , it is possible to quantify the level of
CSO [20]. We denote the set Lrs = {ω ∈ L(H)|O(ω) /∈
Lsafe, ∀ω′ ≺ ω,O(ω′) ∈ Lsafe} as all the strings that will
reveal the secret for the first time. Then the opacity level,
or the probability that the secret is never revealed can be
computed as PCSO = 1− P (Lrs). The computation details
can be found in [24].
B. Insertion function
When the opacity property does not hold, it is desired to
design mechanisms to enforce (in DES) or enhance it (in
SDES). In this paper, we use the insertion functions that
inserts extra observable events before each system event and
then output the modified string. From the intruder’s perspec-
tive, the inserted observable events are not distinguishable
from the observable events that actually happened. Moreover,
we assume that the intruder does not have any information
about the structure of the insertion function. In this way, we
can modify a string ω into ω′ such that |O(ω)| <= |O(ω′)|,
to trick the intruder to think that the system lands in other
states even if the real system lands in a secret state.
The insertion function I : Σ∗o × Σo → Σ
∗
oΣo inserts a
string of observable events before a observable system event
based on the history of previous observable system events.
For example, if there is an observable string ωσ where ω ∈
Σ∗o, σ ∈ Σo, then I(ω, σ) = ω
′σ where ω′ ∈ Σ∗o is the
inserted string. In Figure 1, from the initial state 0, suppose
b happens, the state will transit to 7. But if we insert an
event a before b, that is I(b) = ab, then the intruder will
observe ab and thus thinks the current state is 2. With a
slight abuse of the notation, the insertion function can be
naturally extended to I(ǫ) = ǫ, I(ωσ) = I(ω)I(ω, σ). Then
the modified language given a DES G can be written into
I(O[L(G)]) = {ω′ ∈ Σ∗o|∃ω ∈ O[L(G)], I(ω) = ω
′}.
The insertion function I should satisfy private enforceabil-
ity [4]. Namely, it should be defined to all the possible ob-
servable behaviors of the system. Formally, ∀ωσ ∈ O[L(G)]
where ω ∈ Σ∗o, σ ∈ Σo, ∃ω
′ ∈ Σ∗o, such that I(ω, σ) = ω
′σ.
Furthermore, the output of the insertion function should be
privately safe by enforcing CSO. Formally, I(O[L(G)]) ∈
Lsafe. That is, after insertion, the observed behavior by the
intruder should always lie in Lsafe.
With an insertion function I in an SDES H , the require-
ment to absolute private enforceability may be relaxed. That
is, there may not exist a well-defined insertion function that
achieves CSO enforcement with probability 1. To compare
different insertion functions, we can compute the opacity
level after the insertion. Similarly, we denote the set LIrs =
{ω ∈ L(H)|I[O(ω)] /∈ Lsafe, ∀ω′ ≺ I[O(ω)], ω′ ∈ Lsafe}
as all the strings that will reveal the secret for the first time
after insertion. Then the opacity level can be computed as
P ICSO = 1− P (L
I
rs).
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Given a PSDES PH = (Q,Σ, P, π0, V ), we would like
to synthesize the parameters V and the insertion function
I , such that the opacity level PCSO can be no less than
a given threshold γ. Furthermore, the PSDES should also
satisfy certain task property. In this paper, we are interested
in the reachability specifications written as φt where
φt = P≤λ(♦D)
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, D ⊆ Q and ♦ denotes “eventually”. That
is, we require that the probability to reach any undesired
state q ∈ D is bounded by λ. This reachability probability
can be computed by making the states in D absorbing i.e.,
introducing self loop with probability one on these states,
and treat the PSDES as a Parametric DTMC where the
specification φt can be efficiently verified [25]. Formally,
Problem 1. Given a PSDES PH = (Q,Σ, P, π0, V ), 0 ≤
γ ≤ 1, observation mask O, and the specification φt =
P≤λ(♦D), suppose PCSO < γ, find a valuation v ∈ V alV
and an insertion function I such that P ICSO ≥ γ and φt is
satisfied.
Take the communication network example as shown in
Figure 1, suppose the communication node 5 has very limited
power and computation capability and we would like to
avoid using it too often. Then we could define D = {5}.
Also, we assume that there is an intruder eavesdropping
the transmitted message to determine if the message has
reached the communication node 8 or 9. However, subjected
to the bandwidth and decoding constraints, the intruder could
only partially observe the transmitted message and partially
decode the message to know the message type. We would
like to design the routing probabilities and also the insertion
function, such that the opacity level is no less than γ and
the task specification to avoid using node 5 with probability
larger than 1− λ can be satisfied.
V. MAIN RESULTS
A. Obtaining PMDP for Insertion Function Synthesis
In this paper, we require the following assumption to
guarantee that the structure of the underlying graph of the
PSDES PH does not change.
Assumption 2. For a parametric PSDES PH =
(Q,Σ, P, π0, V ), unless Pv(q, σ, q
′) ∈ 0, 1 for any
evaluation, it must hold that 0 < Pv(q, σ, q
′) < 1
∀v ∈ V alv, ∀q, q′ ∈ Q, ∀σ ∈ Σ where v is an valid
evaluation of the parameter vector V .
Given an SDES H , an MDP M can be constructed to
show all the possible insertion functions or strategies in
MDP’s term [24] with the following assumption to guarantee
that the resulting M has a finite state space.
Assumption 3. Every observable string in H is of a finite
length.
In our case, where the model is a PSDES PH =
(Q,Σ, P, π0, V ), with Assumption 2 and 3, we could follow
the same algorithm to obtain a PMDP M = (S, sˆ, A, T, V ).
Note that this PMDP has a unique initial state sˆ.
This PMDP M = (S, sˆ, A, T ) can be seen as a game
between the system PH and the insertion mechanism. The
states S can be divided into two disjoint sets, namely the
system states Ss and insertion states Si. As shown in Figure
2, the states in single line blocks are system states Ss =
Ei×Es×π, and the states in double line blocks are insertion
states Si = Ei×Es×Σo×π, where Ei is the state estimate of
the intruder after the observation mask O and inserted events,
which could be wrong since it could be fooled by the inserted
events, Es is the system’s state estimate after observation
mask O, which is always correct because it is aware of what
events have been inserted. Σo denotes the recently observed
event from PH . π denotes the state distribution of PH based
on the observed strings without insertions so far. The details
of obtaining this PMDP, including constructing the states,
computing the belief state π and transition probabilities can
be found in [24].
Take the PSDES as shown in Figure 1 as an example,
the resulting M is illustrated in Figure 2. We didn’t show
π in Figure 2 due to the space limitation and π is not
relevant to our further development. The initial position is
s0 = ((0, 0), π(0) = 1). Suppose the event b in H happens,
then the next state which is an insertion state s′ will be
s′ = ((0, 0), b, π(7) = 1) and the transition probability is v3.
The estimates of the intruder and the system don’t change
since the insertion has not been decided yet, and will be
handled at the insertion state s′. As can be observed in Figure
1, there are multiple insertion choices that are available at s′,
such as inserting abc, cac, cba, c, a or the empty string ǫ. For
example, if we choose to insert string abc in front of b, we
will end up in the system state s′′ = ((10, 7), π(7) = 1) with
probability 1. That is, the intruder believes that the current
state is at 10, but the system PH is actually at 7. However,
it can be seen from s′′ that what ever happens in PH later,
either a or c, we could not find a valid insertion. That is,
the insertion strategy gets blocked since there is no valid
insertion action available. From Figure 2, we denote ⊔ as
the set of all the shaded states that are blocking and should
be avoided for opacity enforcement. The desired final state
is (10, 10), π(10) = 1. Once we reach this state, we are done
since both the system and the intruder does not expect any
new events and the opacity has been preserved along the
way.
Remark 1. Note that in this PMDP M, A = Σ∗o∪ ⊥. For
a system state s ∈ Ss, there is only one dummy action ⊥
defined and with certain probability, s will transit to some
s′ ∈ Si. Therefore, the labels σ ∈ Σo on the transition from a
system state to an insertion state does not mean an action in
PMDP, as each action in the MDP should incur a distribution
that sums up to 1. It simply illustrates the event that has just
happened in the PSDES PH . On the other hand, the labels
ω ∈ Σ∗o on the transition from an insertion state to a system
state means an action in the PMDP, which refers to the string
ω to be inserted before the recently observed system event.
Then after the insertion, with probability 1, the insertion state
transits to a system state.
It can be seen that the transition probability from an
insertion state to a system state on an insertion action ω ∈ Σ∗o
will always be 1. And the transition probability from a
system state s to an insertion state s′, given observed history
string ω = σ0σ1...σk−1 and the most recent output event σk
can be computed as
T (s,⊥, s′) = ||π0
k∏
i=0
P ∗uoPσi ||1 (2)
where we define Puo =
∑
σΣuo
Pσ in the PSDES PH =
(Q,Σ, P, π0, V ), so Puo(i, j) denotes the probability to
transit from qi to qj under some unobservable event. Since
PH may be partially observable, an arbitrary number of
unobservable events could happen between any two observ-
able events. Then P ∗uo =
∑∞
i=0 P
i
uo, where P
∗
uo(i, j) denote
the probability to transit from qi to qj under any string
of unobservable events. Puo converges to (In − Puo)−1 if
(0, 0)
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Fig. 2. The obtained PMDP modelM, the shaded states are blocking states belong to the sink set ⊔
∑
q′∈Q
∑
σ∈Σuo
P (q, σ, q′) < 1, as assumed in this paper.
To make sure that our PMDPM satisfies the requirement
that all its transition probabilities belong to the posynomial
function class. We need the following assumption.
Assumption 4. Either Puo is a constant matrix or there exists
a finite integer K such that P kuo = 0, ∀k > K .
Lemma 1. With Assumption 1, the MDP M obtained from
PH = (Q,Σ, P, π0, V ) is a parametric MDP with all its
transition probabilities in the posynomial function class.
Proof. If every element in a vector/matrix is either a posyn-
omial function or 0, we call it a quasi-posynomial vec-
tor/matrix. Denote |Q| = n < ∞, from the definition of
posynomial functions in (1), it can be seen that posynomials
are closed under addition and multiplication, and so are the
quasi-posynomial matrices. Puo =
∑
σΣuo
Pσ is a quasi-
posynomial matrix since Pσ is a quasi-posynomial matrix
and Σuo is a finite set. Then with Assumption 4, if Puo
is a constant quasi-posynomial matrix, P ∗uo will converge
to (In − Puo)−1, which is also guaranteed to be a quasi-
posynomial matrix . Otherwise if P kuo = 0, ∀k > K ,
P ∗uo =
∑K
i=0 P
i
uo, and, thus, P
∗
uo is still a quasi-posynomial
matrix.
From (2) where the transition probability is computed,
π0 is a constant quasi-posynomial vector with n elements.
With Assumption 4, P ∗uo is guaranteed to be a n × n
quasi-posynomial matrix, Pσi is a quasi-posynomial matrix.
Since k is guaranteed to be finite in (2) from Assumption
3, πk = π0
∏k
i=0 P
∗
uoPσi is a quasi-posynomial vector,
where πk(s) denotes the probability of landing in the state
s after observing ω = σ0σ1...σk . Since ω is guaranteed
to be feasible to happen, πk is not possible to be an all-
zero vector. Then the sum of all elements in πk will be
||πk||1 = ||π0
∏k
i=0 P
∗
uoPσi ||1 = T (s,⊥, s
′), is a posyno-
mial function.
B. Insertion Function and Parameter Co-synthesis
Now that we have a PSDES PH = (Q,Σ, P, π0, V ),
where V = {v1, ..., vm} and its PMDP M = (S, sˆ, A, T, V )
that encodes all the possible insertions as its actions. To solve
Problem 1, we need to find a valuation v and a insertion
strategy µ(s, α) that inserts the string α ∈ A = Σ∗o at an
insertion state s ∈ Si, to guarantee that both P
I
CSO ≥ γ and
φt = P≤λ(♦D) are satisfied.
To make our problem more meaningful, we assume that
there does not exist an insertion strategy to enforce the
opacity with probability 1. Otherwise, we could simply use
this insertion function and then synthesize parameters to
enforcement the task specification separately. Instead, we
would like to solve the insertion function and parameter
synthesis when they are coupled. Inspired by [23], the
solution of this parameter and strategy co-synthesis problem
can be converted to a nonlinear program (NLP) (geometric
program (GP), to be more specific) as follows.
minimize F =
m∑
i=1
1
vi
+
∑
s∈S,α∈A(s)
1
µ(s, α)
(3)
subject to (4)
posˆ
1− γ
≤ 1 (5)
ptqˆ
λ
≤ 1 (6)
∀s ∈ S,
∑
α∈A(s)
µ(s, α) ≤ 1 (7)
∀s ∈ S, ∀α ∈ A(s), µ(s, α) ≤ 1 (8)
∀s ∈ S, ∀α ∈ A(s),
∑
s′∈S
T (s, α, s′) ≤ 1 (9)
∀s, s′ ∈ S, ∀α ∈ A(s), T (s, α, s′) ≤ 1 (10)
∀s ∈ ⊔, pos = 1 (11)
∀s ∈ S/⊔,
∑
α∈A(s) µ(s, α)
∑
s′∈S T (s, α, s
′)pos′
pos
≤ 1
(12)
∀q ∈ Q,
∑
q′∈Q
∑
σ∈Σ
P (q, σ, q′) ≤ 1 (13)
∀q ∈ D, ptq = 1 (14)
∀q ∈ Q\D,
∑
σ∈Σ
∑
q′∈Q P (q, σ, q
′)ptq′
ptq
≤ 1 (15)
Equation (5) and (6) encode the CSO requirement and
the task specification respectively. Intuitively, from (11) and
(12), it can be observed that pos denotes the upper bound of
the probability to reach the sink set ⊔ from a state s in the
PMDP M and thus PCSO ≥ 1 − posˆ ≥ γ where sˆ is the
initial state of the PMDP M. From (14) and (15), it can be
seen that pts denotes the upper bound of the probability to
reach the undesired set D, so from the specification φt, we
require ptqˆ ≤ λ where qˆ is the initial state of the PSDES
PH . Equation (7) denotes the requirement for the scheduler
of the PMDP, observe that F in (3) is monotonic with regard
to µ(s, α), therefore the optimal solution from this NLP will
achieve the equality, which satisfies the requirement that the
probability of the scheduler’s choice at each state should sum
up to 1. Equation (8) and (10) requires that the probabilities
should be bounded by 1. As to (9), F is monotonic with
respect to V , if T (s, α, s′) is a posynomial of V , it will also
be monotonic with respect to V . Then the equality will be
achieved, which satisfies the requirement that the action α
induces a distribution that sums up to 1. The same argument
applies to (13).
Theorem 1. With the encoding (3) - (15), if the solution
finds a well-defined scheduler and valuation v, this solution
then solves the Problem 1 and respects Assumption 1 and 2.
Proof. From (3), it can be seen that to minimize F , the
parameters vi ∈ V are not going to be zero, which implies
that Assumption 2 holds. Because of the monotonicity of
F with respect to V and (13),
∑
q′∈Q
∑
σ∈Σ P (q, σ, q
′) ∈
{0, 1} in Assumption 1 is assured.
Since vi 6= 0, ∀i ∈ [1,m], we have P (q, σ, q′) > 0 for
any q, q′, σ ∈ Σo, therefore
∑
q′∈Q
∑
σ∈Σuo
P (q, σ, q′) < 1
is also assured. Thus, Assumption 1 is satisfied.
As for the PCSO requirement, since p
o
sˆ ≥ 1 − PCSO and
posˆ ≤ 1−γ as required in (5), it implies that PCSO ≥ 1−p
o
sˆ ≥
γ. Similarly for φt requirement, λ ≥ ptqˆ ≥ P (♦D).
Remark 2. Note that in this NLP encoding, we assume PH
has a unique initial state, while in our previous definition of
PSDES, our initial condition is a distribution on the states.
This can be easily converted to the unique initial state case by
adding a dummy initial state qˆ and the transition probability
from qˆ is according to the initial distribution π0.
Furthermore, in Problem 1, we are looking for a deter-
ministic insertion function I . But from the encoding, we
get a probabilistic insertion function where the probability
of inserting a string α is determined by µ(s, α). From F
we know that µ(s, α) > 0, ∀s ∈ S, α ∈ A(s), so if
there are multiple insertion choices, our insertion strategy
may choose any one of them with non-zero probability. But
nevertheless, our resulting insertion strategy still satisfies the
CSO requirement.
Also, note that this encoding is not complete. If we fail
to find a valid solution, it doesn’t mean that a valid solution
doesn’t exist.
C. An Illustrative Example
Let’s return to our motivating example as shown in Figure
1 and its PMDP in Figure 2. The secret state are 8 and
9, and the state we would like to avoid is 5. The opacity
and reachability constraints are PCSO ≤ γ = 0.15 and
φt = P≤λ(♦D) where λ = 0.3. We encode our prob-
lem following (3)-(15) and solve it using the optimization
solver GGPLAB [26]. The resulting parameters are v1 =
0.3501, v2 = 0.3501, v3 = 0.2998, v4 = 0.5, v5 = 0.5, v6 =
0.5, v7 = 0.5. And the resulting insertion strategy is shown in
Figure 3. On the transition arrow from the insertion function
station to a system state, the number after the inserted
string denotes the probability that the insertion function
chooses to select this insertion action. For example, from
the initial state, event a has probability v1 to happen, and
then the system transits to ((0, 0), a) where, with probability
1− 2 ∗ 10−5, nothing is inserted and then the MDP transits
to (1, 1) with probability 1, which implies that both the real
and intruder’s state estimation are 1. With our synthesized
parameters and the insertion strategy, P ICSO = 0.15 and
P (♦D) = 0.2507. Note that in this particular example,
for instance, the insertions abc, cac, cba all make the state
transits from ((0, 0), b) to (10, 7) with probability 1. Our
synthesized strategy actually assigns a total probability of
10−5 to choose among abc, cac, cab while not specifying the
exact probability to choose each individual string.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we solved an insertion function and param-
eter co-synthesis problem on a parametric model, such that
both the opacity requirement and task specification can be
enforced. The problem was encoded to a nonlinear program
and solved. We showed that the solution of this program is
a valid one if it respects all the constraints. Future work will
consider distributed co-synthesis framework with multiple
intruders.
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